Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable. by Fu,  Tingting et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
23 January 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Fu, Tingting and Ji, Yunan and Kamei, Kenju and Putterman, Louis (2017) 'Punishment can support
cooperation even when punishable.', Economics letters., 154 . pp. 84-87.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2017 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Punishment Can Support Cooperation Even When Punishable 
Tingting Fu
a
, Yunan Ji
b
, Kenju Kamei
c
, Louis Putterman
d* 
a
Department of Economics, Nankai University, China 
b
Harvard University GSAS, United States 
c
Durham University Business School, United Kingdom 
d
Department of Economics, Brown University, United States  
*Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 401 863 3837. Email: Louis_Putterman@brown.edu 
 
Abstract: Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do 
opportunities to punish punishers harm cooperation and its benefits by deterring first order 
punishment and wasting resources? We compare treatments of a decision experiment without 
peer punishment and with one order of punishment to ones in which subjects can be punished for 
punishing or for failing to punish. Our treatments with higher-order punishment achieve as much 
improvement in cooperation as those with only one punishment stage. We see evidence of social 
norms in action, but no evidence of punishing failure to punish. These results suggest that 
higher-order punishment is neither critical to nor a major deterrent to cooperation.          
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A lively discussion among evolutionary theorists addresses the problem of reconciling observed 
human cooperation with the drive to maximize reproductive fitness (Sober and Wilson, 1998, 
Boyd and Richerson, 2009, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). Many contributors assign a large role 
to social norms enforced by peer punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Henrich, 2004). But 
controversy exists over whether the punishability of punishment choices themselves—higher-
order punishment—is helpful or harmful to cooperation. Whereas the theorists argue that 
individuals standing ready to punish those who omit to punish may be a key stabilizer of first-
order punishment (Axelrod, 1986, Henrich and Boyd, 2001), some laboratory decision studies 
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have found that opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment are efficiency-reducing 
(Denant-Boemont et al., 2007, Nikiforakis, 2008).  
 
We conduct an experiment comparing cooperation dilemmas without punishment opportunities 
or with only one order of punishment to ones permitting multiple orders of punishment under 
varying information conditions. In our main treatments, each of 240 subjects is grouped with 
three others in sessions of 20 participants. Each makes decisions on allocating funds between a 
private account and a group account in a standard voluntary contribution design of 15 periods in 
fixed groups. As with past experiments, selfish rational actors with common knowledge of type 
are predicted to put all tokens in their private accounts, but in line with past results subjects in 
the Baseline (no punishment) condition initially put about half of tokens in the group account, 
their average contribution then declining with repetition (Ledyard, 1995, Zelmer, 2003). In 
treatment Punish 1, we add now-standard opportunities to punish fellow group members after 
being shown their contributions, in a second stage of each period. Punishing, because costly to 
the punisher, is not predicted of selfish rational actors, but like past studies the treatment 
generates much punishing, mostly directed at lower contributors and mostly from higher ones, 
and contributions are significantly higher than Baseline and show a rising rather than declining 
trend until the final period (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Gächter et al., 2008).  
 
In our third treatment, Punish 2, each period has a third stage in which subjects learn the amount 
and originator of any punishment they received in the second one and can spend money to 
counter-punish.  In their similar treatments, Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis 
(2008) found substantial counter-punishment, decline in first-order punishing, and more decline 
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of contributions. Consistent with the first finding, our subjects counter-punish 29% of punishing 
events. Nevertheless, average contributions are also significantly higher than Baseline in Punish 
2, and there is no significant difference in contributions or earnings between Punish 1 and Punish 
2. 83.3% of first-order punishing in Punish 1 and 95% in Punish 2 go to below-average 
contributors (two-tailed group-level Mann-Whitney test, z=-1.060, p=0.2892).  As we show in 
the Appendix, in both treatments, below-average contributors increase their contribution from 
one period to the next by a larger amount the more punishment they receive. The pattern of 
counter-punishing also suggests presence of implicit norms: in Punish 2, a unit of first-order 
(stage 2) punishment given by a lower to a higher contributor (antisocial punishment in the 
terminology of Herrmann et al. 2008) triggers an average of 0.56 units of counter-punishment (in 
stage 3), whereas a unit of punishment from a higher to a lower contributor (prosocial 
punishment) leads to 0.24 units of counter-punishment.  
 
Punish 2 allows a punished individual j to punish back her punisher i, but information about 
punishing or lack thereof between other pairs of group members is not made available, and third-
party enforcement, such as punishing those who fail to punish low contributors or those who 
punish high contributors, is ruled out. We explore these omissions by conducting Punish 2´, a 
treatment in which we show subjects information about all punishments, then allow them to 
punish in the period’s second punishment stage without restriction, keeping fixed subject 
identifiers for all periods a group interacts. Subjects are also shown a reminder of the previous 
period’s contributions and punishments and of average contribution and punishments of each 
group member and dyad in periods before that, easing demands on memory. Figure 1 shows that 
the pattern of contributions over time in Punish 2´ is similar to the patterns in Punish 2 and 
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Punish 1. Figure 2 compares the average contribution and earnings across the four treatments: 
contributions are significantly higher in Punish 2´ than in Baseline, but there is no statistically 
significant difference in contribution between Punish 2´ and either Punish 2 or Punish 1. Average 
earnings are higher in each treatment allowing punishment than in Baseline. Although these 
pairwise earnings differences are statistically significant only for Punish 1 (p = 0.031) and 
Punish 2´ (p = 0.065), there are no statistically significant differences in earnings between any 
two punishment treatments, meaning presence of an additional punishment stage in Punish 2 and 
Punish 2´ does not significantly lower earnings relative to Punish 1. These findings are 
corroborated using random effects tobit and ordered probit regressions, as shown in our 
Appendix. 
 
Fig. 1. Average amount contributed, out of 20 tokens, by period and treatment. See text for 
treatment descriptions. 
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Fig. 2. Average contribution (in the left panel) and average earnings (in the right panel), by 
treatment. p-values from two-tailed Mann-Whitney Tests of group-level average contribution 
across all 15 periods are shown at the top of each panel. N = 20 groups (80 subjects) in Baseline 
and Punish 1, 10 groups (40 subjects) in Punish 2 and Punish 2´. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 
0.01 
 
As in Punish 2, Punish 2´ manifests costly punishment and costly counter-punishment, the latter 
occurring on average in 41% of instances of first-order punishment, not statistically significantly 
different from the 29% in Punish 2 (two-tailed group-level Mann-Whitney test, z = -0.090, p = 
0.9283).  The pattern of counter-punishment is similar, with 0.85 units of counter-punishment 
per unit when the punishment is antisocial, versus 0.42 units when it is prosocial. 56% (62%) of 
antisocial punishment events draw counter-punishment in Punish 2´ (Punish 2), whereas only 
24% (28%) of prosocial punishment events are counter-punished. The differences in frequency 
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of counter-punishment when punishment is prosocial versus antisocial are statistically significant 
in the linear regression models of Table 1 and similar ordered logit regression models (see 
Appendix Table A9). A pooled linear regression model (see Table A10) shows that frequency of 
counter-punishment of each type does not significantly differ between Punish 2 and Punish 2´. 
 Dependent variable: Counter-punishment event dummy 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
 Punish 2 Punish 2´ Punish 2 Punish 2´ Punish 2 Punish 2´ 
Antisocial punishment 
(dummy) 
0.235*** 0.358***     
(0.086) (0.061)     
Max {(Cjt – Cit), 0}×  
antisocial punishment 
dummy 
  0.050*** 0.016***   
  (0.007) (0.004)   
Max {(Cjt – Cit), 0}×  
(Pijt if Cjt ≥Cit , else 0) 
    0.044*** 0.003** 
    (0.008) (0.001) 
Constant 0.290*** 0.203*** 0.287*** 0.308*** 0.280*** 0.339*** 
(0.050) (0.076) (0.045) (0.090) (0.041) (0.094) 
Observations 118 75 118 75 118 75 
Number of subjects 27 25 27 25 27 25 
R-squared 0.0628 0.1118 0.0699 0.0121 0.0852 0.0022 
Wald Chi-squared 7.49 34.56 54.84 16.74 27.28 5.74 
Prob > Chi-squared 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0166 
 
Table 1. Linear probability regression model of probability of counter-punishment as a function 
of type of first-order punishment. Regressions include all period-subject pair observations in 
which i punished j in stage 2 of the period. The dependent variable is 1 if j punished i back in 
stage 3, else 0. In column (i) and (ii), antisocial punishment takes value 1 if j’s contribution in 
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the period was greater than or equal to i’s, else 0. Regressions include individual random effects 
and group-level clustering of errors. The result shows that counter-punishment occurs with 
probability of about 0.3 or 0.2 when punishment is prosocial, versus probabilities of about 0.53 
or 0.56 when punishment is antisocial, with difference of counter-punishment incidence being 
statistically significant at the 1% level in each treatment. In column (iii) and (iv), the independent 
variable is an interaction term of the antisocial punishment dummy variable and the positive 
deviation of j's contribution from i’s, arguably a measure of “how antisocial” the punishment 
event was. In column (v) and (vi), the independent variable is the product of the previous 
specification’s deviation term and the amount of punishment i gave to j, hence modifying the 
column (iii) and (iv) variable to also account for the amount of punishment j is reacting to. When 
we add to the independent variables the total 1
st
 order punishment received by j, the coefficients 
and significance levels of the main explanatory variables remain the same, while the coefficient 
on the additional variable is not significant. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.05 *** p < 
0.01 
 
Regression analysis (see Table A4 and other Appendix tables) makes clear that the more a 
subject punishes in the first punishment stage, the more he or she is punished in the second. This 
holds both when first order punishment is prosocial and when it is antisocial. Indicator variables 
for giving no punishment or for failing to punish a low contributor when the opportunity arises 
are negatively associated with punishment received in the period’s final stage, significantly so in 
several specifications (see Appendix Tables A5 – A7). As an additional check, we conduct a 
treatment resembling Denant-Boemont et al.'s No Revenge treatment, wherein subjects are 
shown only punishing not directed at themselves. Here, too, regressions indicate that giving no 
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first order punishment is if anything negatively associated with second order punishment 
received (see Appendix discussion of the Punish 2k treatment). Together, these results imply that 
the least higher-order punishment goes to non-punishers, hence higher-order punishment 
provides no net inducement to punish. 
 
We conclude that whereas some experimental studies of cooperation have questioned whether 
the apparent benefits of peer punishment for cooperation can withstand the availability of higher-
order punishment, our study of such punishment in a new laboratory experiment finds that the 
positive impact of first order punishment opportunities on cooperation is not an artifact of 
punishers being protected from higher-order punishment. Higher-order punishment does not 
significantly affect the cooperation-inducing effects of first-order punishment, among our 
subjects.
1
 By the same token, whereas some evolutionary theorists have hypothesized that 
punishment of those who free-ride on punishment might explain how a tendency to punish could 
have evolved and stabilized, higher-order punishment shows no sign of encouraging first-order 
punishment in our experiment. 
                                                 
1
 Conceivably, a source of difference between our results and those of Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis 
(2008) is that our subjects are students at universities in Tianjin, China, rather than Europe. In the Appendix, we 
investigate this issue in detail with data from Herrmann et al. (2008) to find that the Tianjin subjects’ behaviors are 
quite like those of European and U.S. counterparts in most respects. We also discuss the differences of our results 
from those of Kamei and Putterman (2015), a related U.S. experiment that attains qualitatively similar results to 
those authors in a treatment resembling Punish 2, but differences with both those authors and our present results in a 
treatment resembling Punish 2´.  
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